You Don’t Want Berkshire to Pay Dividends
May/090
This year Carol Loomis asked the question whether Berkshire should start paying dividends since the stock price hasn’t risen in 5 years. This was in reference to Buffett longstanding quote that he will pay a dividend when he thinks he can’t create at least $1 of market value for each $1 of retained earnings. Jeff Matthews refers to this as a question that Buffett avoided answering in this thought provoking blog post.
My opinion is who cares whether Buffett answered the dividend question. If you are even asking the question, you should sell your Berkshire stock. The reason to own Berkshire is to get access to Buffett’s capital allocation decisions. Based on his well-documented track record and his well-know thought process, most Berkshire investors think Buffett can make better investment decisions and/or has access to better investment opportunities than they do. The last thing Berkshire investors should want is to have Buffett return the cash back to them in a taxable transaction. Then, the investors will have to decide how to allocate the returned cash.
Historically, investors have wanted management teams to pay dividends because they don’t trust management to spend the free cash flow from the business wisely. The business may be not need capital reinvestment, like Coca-Cola, or it may be a business in secular decline where the best thing to do is harvest the cash rather than reinvest. Shareholders of these businesses probably want managements to pay dividends to make sure they don’t destroy value.
Since the main reason to own Berkshire is to get access to Buffett’s capital allocation skills, if an investor wants Berkshire to pay dividends, then they should sell the stock instead because they obviously don’t believe in Buffett’s ability to create value by allocating capital.
There is a scenario where it makes sense for an investor to want Berkshire to pay a dividend. Maybe an investor thinks Buffett destroys value but think Berkshire is so undervalued that they can make a return by owning the stock and getting him to change his dividend policy. I don’t think Berkshire is anywhere close to a valuation level where this would make sense. At $91,500 per share, Berkshire trades at 1.4x tangible book. It would have to trade below tangible book value for this strategy to make sense.
The reason to invest in Berkshire is get access to Buffett’s skills as a capital allocator. If you want him to pay a dividend, you shouldn’t own the stock. You should ignore the 5-year rolling test about whether he adds more $1 of value for each $1 of retained earnings. He is never going to pay a dividend because he’ll never admit that he can’t add value. If he ever does decide to pay a dividend, you won’t want to own Berkshire.
Buy-and-Hold is not Buy-and-Forget
May/090
The Peridot Capitalist wrote an interesting article defending Buy-and-Hold investing. He argues that Buy-and-Hold doesn’t work if one ignores valuation. I agree with him and would extend his argument to include that we can’t ignore whether a company’s franchise is getting strong and weaker while executing a buy-and-hold strategy. Buy-and-hold, as practiced by Buffett and Munger, involves investing in companies with strong franchises. As time goes by, the franchises either get stronger as profits are reinvested in the business to create a stronger brand or expand distribution or introduce new products, or sometimes, franchises get weaker because of shifts in consumer tastes, increased competition or regulatory changes. Monitoring changes in a company’s franchise strength is an important part of a buy-and-hold strategy.
Using Peridot’s Coke example, not only was valuation stretched in the late 1990s, but Coke’s franchise has weakened. Coke’s major market of carbonated soda drinks (CSDs) has stagnated. Consumers are shifting to healthier non-carbonated drinks such as water, iced tea and sports drinks. Coke missed a major opportunity to buy Gatorade’s parent, Quaker Oats, due to a board revolt against the CEO. Even though the price for Quaker was high at the time, the continued growth of Gatorade may have justified the acquisition. As a franchise like Coke’s gets weaker, investors are less willing to pay high valuations for the stock.
The advantages of Buy-and-Hold are the power of compounding and tax-deferral. Potential Buy-and-Hold investments are companies that can compound their earnings growth at high rates of return for many years. These companies are often in stable businesses or industries. They may have pricing power over their customers or may have recurring revenues under long-term contracts. These companies reinvest their excess profits back into their franchise to make it even stronger. By holding the same stocks for years, investors are getting a interest free loan from the government by not having to pay taxes on gains until the investment is sold.
“Buy-and-hold” is not a “Buy-and-Forget” strategy. As Peridot suggests, the valuation of a stock is extremely important when buying a position. As time passes, investors also need to continually monitor the strength of the company’s franchise. As a company’s franchise weakens or threats to the business franchise emerge, investors should exit these long-term holdings.
At Gator Capital, we follow a buy-and-hold strategy but are rigorous about valuation and franchise strength. We do heavy valuation work prior to entering a position. We also monitor valuation through the life of the investment. We also assess the business franchise of the company and continually monitor the company for any changes in a franchise’s strength.
Tampa Investment Manager Blog Introduction
May/090
This is my blog. I founded Gator Capital Management in 2008. In this blog, I will share my thoughts about investing and links that I find interesting during my investment research.
Here’s my bio:
In 2008, Derek Pilecki founded Gator Capital Management. From 2002 through 2008, Derek was a co-Chair of the Investment Committee and a Portfolio Manager for Goldman Sach’s Growth Equity Team, where he helped to manage $30 billion in high quality growth stocks.
Derek was also a member of the portfolio management team responsible for the Goldman Sachs Capital Growth Fund, and provided primary coverage of the financial sector for the Growth Team.
Prior to Goldman, Derek was an Analyst at Clover Capital Management in Rochester, New York and Burridge Growth Partners (now part of Essex Investments) in Chicago, Illinois. Before entering graduate school, Derek worked at Fannie Mae providing risk analysis for the company’s mortgage investment portfolio.
Derek holds an MBA with honors in Finance and Accounting from the University of Chicago and a BA in Economics from Duke University.